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Genocide Is a Process, Not an Event
Sheri P. Rosenberg1
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York
Genocide studies is simultaneously an emerging and accepted category of scholarly inquiry. The ﬁeld
is robust and at a critical turning point as more disciplines engage the subject. This article identiﬁes
two areas within the ﬁeld that suggest the need for further scholarly attention. First, it urges a
renewed attention to the processional nature of genocide and the implications that ﬂow from a particularized understanding of it, speciﬁcally in relation to prevention. The article explores this relationship by providing a process-oriented examination of the under-theorized concept of "genocide by
attrition," seeking engagement and critique of the concept. Second, new disciplines have entered the
ﬁeld of genocide studies, bringing with them new methodologies and insights. While this is a welcome
advance, genocide studies must move from multidisciplinary to interdisciplinary research to avoid
fragmentation and achieve the diverse objectives of the ﬁeld.
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Since the early 1990s there has been a renewed interest in the subject of genocide and
its prevention. The scholarly attention has been vibrant and dynamic. In fact, there is
now a category of scholarly inquiry speciﬁcally dedicated to and referred to by many as
“genocide studies.” It is a diffuse and multidisciplinary ﬁeld in which vigorous debates
over deﬁnitions continue in full force. In fact, as of 2001 political scientist Scott Straus
noted approximately 21 different deﬁnitions of the term “genocide.”2 To some, genocide is a classic example of an essentially contested term. And at least one scholar argues
that its contentious status precludes its acceptance as an actual discipline,3 while for
others deﬁnitional disputes provide energy to historical and cultural debates.4 Regardless
of one’s stance in this debate, one cannot deny that the study of genocide and its prevention is healthy and maturing. More disciplines are weighing in, bringing their own
sets of methodologies to the table. For example, micro studies by contemporary political
scientists such as Scott Straus and Lee Ann Fujii provide nuanced and complex analyses
to complement theories of blind masses, ancient ethnic hatreds, and elite divide-andconquer strategies. Historians are looking at macro factors across space and time to
focus on exogeneous and endogenous factors. Critical genocide studies is starting to
take root with the work of historian A. Dirk Moses, sociologist Thomas Cushman, and
others. These scholars attempt to interrogate some of the fundamental assumptions
and biases that exist throughout most scholarship related to genocide studies. When
scholars within their own discipline begin to critique their own acquisition of knowledge, it becomes apparent that a ﬁeld of inquiry has been established. Nonetheless, old
debates persist and new challenges have emerged.
Among the categories of inquiry, there has been a thread of scholarship explicitly
dedicated to exploring the genocidal process and the implications that ﬂow from deducing a particularized understanding of it.5 The “genocidal process” is a relatively
indeterminate term, and it is the notion of the complex genocidal process that will
Sheri P. Rosenberg, “Genocide Is a Process, Not an Event,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, 1
(April 2012): 16–23. © 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention. doi: 10.3138/gsp.7.1.16

Genocide as Process

17

be the focus of this article, which urges renewed attention to exploring the social phenomenon of genocide as a process rather than as the outcome of a process. The rigid
conception of genocide as a deﬁnition (as opposed to a social phenomenon) of “something” against which unfolding events are to be measured is in part due to the very success and standing of the concept in international law. The emphasis on legalism
subjects each genocide to a rigid test in order to maintain the integrity of the term and
determine criminal culpability. This, however, has caused some authors and policy
makers to lose sight of the fact that genocide is a ﬂuid and complex social phenomenon,
not a static term. This process perspective is crucial to the detection and standardization
of early warning indicators for the prevention of genocide, a goal which many genocide
scholars seek to pursue.6 As Bloxham and Moses argue, “the focus on speciﬁc types of
outcomes that qualify as genocide is analogous to studying the peaks of mountains
from above a cloud-line that only particularly tall mountains penetrate, when a glimpse
beneath the cloud-line would illustrate that other mountains fall just short.”7 Hence, if
one focuses on how the process of genocide unfolds and the acts that are often perpetrated on the victim—both indirectly and directly—during the genocidal process, then
one might begin to link these preliminary or early acts to the efforts of genocide prevention. Moreover, a process-oriented approach provides lawyers and jurists with a lens
through which to interpret the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). This approach aids in the interpretation of
the UNCG’s dual goals of prevention and punishment.
Genocide discourse may be unpacked in a variety of ways. One’s approach is naturally inﬂuenced by his or her personal, ideological, and academic discipline. For the
purpose of this review, we will adhere to the deﬁnition of the phenomenon set forth in
the 1948 UNCG.8 While Professor William Schabas seeks, in my view, an overly narrow
and restrictive interpretation of the UNCG itself, we agree when he suggests that “[f]or
decades the Genocide Convention has been asked to shoulder a burden for which it was
never intended, essentially because of the relatively underdeveloped state of international law dealing with accountability for human rights violations.”9 Today, there is a
relatively well-developed body of international law that deals with mass atrocities and
is codiﬁed in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. As a
result, mass atrocities that are crying out for individual accountability no longer need
to be corralled under the crime of genocide; rather, the individuals who commit
these atrocities that fall short of genocide can be brought to justice for crimes against
humanity.
Nonetheless, pushing the outer boundaries of the UNCG and arguing for an interpretation of the crime that approximates contemporary instances of its pursuit, rather
than static and narrow interpretations that dismiss Raphael Lemkin’s original conception and the modern-day occurrences that do not—and will not—ﬁt the paradigm or
politics of the 1940s (the years during which the UNCG was ﬁnalized), has merit. After
all, as Nigel Eltringham eloquently suggests, the danger with classiﬁcations (and concrete deﬁnitions) is that we will “set out to prove that our abstract concepts . . . really do
correspond to reality, rather than being contingent approximations.”10 With this in
mind, it becomes evident that genocide is a complex social phenomenon that cannot
solely be disaggregated into its parts and tucked neatly into a deﬁnition. Rather, it must
be understood as an unfolding process to be viewed against or within historical, political, and social factors. What follows is a brief analysis of the evolution of concept of
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the genocidal process, followed by a summary of a theory of “genocide by attrition” and
how the development of this concept, heretofore under-theorized, can be useful for
early warning, and hence prevention, of genocide. Finally, this article concludes with a
number of suggestions for future directions in genocide studies.
Genocide as Process in Genocide Studies
While many early studies have focused on comparative analysis of speciﬁc cases, an increasing number of scholars have taken the broader view of genocide as a complex and
dynamic process. These scholars explore the causal contexts of genocide by using structure and agency theories to understand the process. They analyze structures of government, political systems, and relevant socioeconomic, cultural, and historical factors.11
Some genocide scholars have synthesized and reduced this complex process into the
many “stages” of genocide. According to Gregory H. Stanton, genocide “develops in
eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable.”12 The stages are classiﬁcation, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, identiﬁcation, extermination,
and denial. Helen Fein, examining the Holocaust, identiﬁes ﬁve necessary and usually
sequential stages of genocide: “deﬁnition (identifying discrimination victims), stripping
(of rights, roles, ofﬁces, claims), segregation (enforced compulsory wearing of the yellow
star), isolation, concentration.”13 These stages preceded the Final Solution. More recently, Jacques Semelin, in his book Purify and Destroy, has investigated the sources of
mass killing using the Holocaust, Rwanda, and Bosnia as the primary sources for his explorations. He seeks to create a political sociology of mass murder and, among other
things, explores the dynamic process of implementation against the historical and political backgrounds of each situation.14 Although these stages are broad enough to cover
most instances of genocide, it is unlikely there is a single process of genocide. As Leo
Kuper notes, “[t]he forms of genocide are too varied, with quite different sequences of
action, and great differences in scale, raising different ‘logistic’ problems.”15 Technological sophistication, geographical concentration of victims, bureaucratic efﬁciency, and
the possibility of reciprocal violence are some of the variables that differentiate one
genocide from another and resist the easy accommodation of a linear model of the
genocidal process.
Contributing to the body of literature, which seeks to understand a speciﬁc genocide’s complex and evolving nature with prevention in mind, this article sets forth
a brief conceptualization of the genocidal process that can be marked by the term
“genocide by attrition” to bring to the foreground what is often in the background:
genocide is a process, a collective cataclysm, that relies more heavily—than currently
appreciated—on indirect methods of destruction for its success.16 It is the excessive
focus on violent deaths and a preoccupation with the numbers of victims that have
obscured alternative means of annihilation and have thereby missed the signals of
unfolding tragedies. In fact, many victims of historical genocides died from slower,
“indirect,” and less immediately deadly methods than outright murder. For example,
approximately 13.7% of all Jewish Holocaust victims died as a result of disease and
starvation attributable to their conﬁnement in dire, despondent, and life-threatening
ghettos at a time prior to their deportation to forced-labor and extermination camps.17
This theory is not intended to offer yet another typology of stages. Rather, it presents a
list of attributes that are likely to occur at different stages of genocide and follow their
own distinct paths of development.
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Genocide by Attrition: A Process-based View
As the ﬁeld continues to grow, new and important ways of looking at and describing
genocide are found. The emphasis on strict, narrow legalism in genocide interpretation
coupled with the conceptual link between genocide and the paradigmatic case, the
Holocaust, have imposed a restrictive reading on the term set out in the UNCG. Justiﬁably, this perceived rigidity led those witnessing the developing crises and unfolding
violence in today’s complex international arena to search for a more ﬂexible term
that would nevertheless maintain the emotional and conceptual force of the genocide
concept.
The term genocide by attrition is relatively new to common parlance. While the
term has been used before, it is most notably associated with the crisis unfolding in Darfur, Sudan.18 Eric Reeves, who has closely monitored the situation in Darfur, has been
the most ardent supporter of the view that what has occurred since late 2004 or early
2005, after the more direct killings took place, is genocide by attrition. As Reeves observed in 2005, “[s]ometime in the summer of 2004 (we will never know precisely
when), genocidal destruction became more a matter of engineered disease and malnutrition than violent killing, [as] there came a point . . . in which ongoing genocide was
no longer primarily a result of slaughter, but a cruel attrition.”19 Both Nicholas D. Kristof’s work as well as that of Michael Petrou and Luiza Savage describes what we are witnessing in Darfur as “genocide in slow motion.”20 More recently, Gerard Prunier has
drawn attention to the constellation of violence by describing death in Darfur as “killing
by attrition.”21 Moreover, countless news media outlets wantonly describe the situation
in Darfur as “genocide by attrition” or “genocide in slow motion.”22
Although the term is bandied about with some frequency, there has been little
attempt to provide it with a theoretical, legal, or conceptual foundation. Most uses of
the phrase are loose and descriptive. However, by engaging in a comparative analysis of
prior genocides and of the contemporary usage of the term, it becomes evident that
genocide by attrition essentially describes a slow process of annihilation that reﬂects the
unfolding phenomenon of the mass killing of a protected group rather than the immediate unleashing of violent death. The methods of genocide by attrition describe
state (or non-state) policies and practices which deprive individuals of a speciﬁc set of
human rights; such policies and practices do not cause the immediate death of an individual but rather lead to the slow and steady death of the individual and the annihilation of the group.23
The concept of genocide by attrition set forth in this article is consistent with the
UNCG. While grounding the legal deﬁnition of genocide in physical annihilation, the
UNCG deﬁnes acts that constitute genocide not only as acts of immediate physical
destruction but also as acts which create conditions that will lead to physical destruction, including the inﬂiction of physical and mental harm, acts to arrest procreation,
the transfer of children, and incitement to genocide.24 Thus, genocide by attrition is
not a new deﬁnition of genocide or one that intends to stretch the meaning of the crime
of genocide as set forth in the UNCG to accommodate emotional, political, or tactical
resorts to the term. Moreover, genocide by attrition does not replace the concept of
genocide; instead it draws attention to the genocidal process (rather than the outcome
of a process) and illuminates the prominent role that indirect methods of annihilation
play in the genocidal process.
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Practices and policies of genocide by attrition primarily, but not exclusively, include
forced displacement, the denial of health and health care, the denial of food, and sexual
violence. Empirical evidence from cases of genocide points to this set of attributes and
suggests several tentative conclusions about the genocidal process.25 First, indirect
methods of mass killing play a more important role in the genocidal process than previous models have suggested. Second, indirect methods of annihilation might occur at different points in the linear process and/or might reﬂect a jumping or collapsing of
stages. The concept of genocide by attrition ultimately helps correct the view of genocide as a primarily directly murderous event that can simply be tracked back to individual culpability in order to assign moral and legal responsibility.
Genocide by Attrition and Prevention
The failure to apprehend the process of genocide by attrition reﬂects a general failure to
understand the link between the conditions of life that bring about the physical annihilation of the group and the policy decisions that bring about such conditions. This oversight is particularly troubling where early warning of genocide is concerned. Generally,
early warning systems seek to collect, analyze, and communicate information about
escalating situations that are developing or could develop into genocide.26 The UNCG
requires state parties to prevent and punish the crime it seeks to prohibit. Thus, unlike
most other human rights laws and even international criminal laws, there is a direct
obligation upon states to prevent genocide. Until February 2007, when the International
Court of Justice issued its decision in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia,27
there was a debate among scholars on whether the prevention clause in the UNCG created a legal rather than a moral obligation upon states. This decision settled the matter.
The International Court of Justice held that prevention is a legal obligation and one that
is separate from the obligation to punish genocide. Moreover, it found Serbia liable for
failing to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica. More than 136 states have undertaken an
obligation to prevent genocide, and the prohibition of genocide is jus cogens—that is, a
norm so fundamental that no state can derogate from it.
The obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the need for effective early
warning. Of course, there is no human phenomenon that is 100% preventable. All we
can do is develop and enhance our techniques of early detection and pay close attention
to each situation that appears to be percolating. The paradigm is the same in health
care as it is in international relations: each of these ﬁelds is concerned with regulating
intervention in relation to death risks. Like in the ﬁeld of health care, the beneﬁts of
accurately preventing genocide greatly outweigh the risks associated with robust enthusiasm in early detection. Speciﬁcally, focusing on discriminatory forced displacement,
discriminatory denial of health and health care, discriminatory denial of food, and targeted sexual violence provides a clear set of attributes of the genocidal process, thus
distinguishing them from the noise of regular human rights reporting. While these attributes generally continue throughout the genocidal process, they often occur during the
earlier stages. For example, it might not have been as easy to send Jews into death
camps during the Holocaust if they had not been previously displaced from their
homes, often into ghettos where hundreds of thousands of Jews died from disease and
starvation. Likewise, sexual violence is more likely to occur to women or children who
are displaced from their homes. Thus, clearly recognizing these attributes of the genocidal process might aid in identifying early warnings in advance or at a relatively early
stage of the conﬂict. Early warning might be doomed to failure if it cannot make
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predictions at a relatively early stage. Once a crisis has fully unfolded and the dynamic
murderous process is well underway, policy options for the international society are signiﬁcantly restricted. In particular, once military intervention is the only realistic option
on the table, relevant stakeholders are left with a virtual Pandora’s Box, where complex
legal, moral, and political issues abound.
While most early warning systems identify a build-up of human rights violations
as an early warning indicator, broad emphasis on human rights abuses might potentially overwhelm the models with too many variables, creating the opposite problem of
the rigid interpretation of genocide. The information overload makes it difﬁcult to identify emerging patterns of genocidal violence from other deteriorating situations. The
concept of genocide by attrition proposes a framework that short-circuits both of those
problems by narrowing the universe of variables.
Conclusion and New Directions in Genocide Studies
In the evolution of genocide studies, all of the participating disciplines have made signiﬁcant contributions and provided much-needed insights. Nonetheless, in the existing
literature, ranging from philosophy to law, there is a lack of an overarching methodology or theoretical convergence of how to approach the subject. As a result, there is a
pronounced murkiness in the ﬁeld and an inability to move on from old debates (e.g.,
over deﬁnitions) that stymie the ﬁeld’s development and inhibit its potential. Moreover,
it does not appear that anyone has addressed the implications of the social sciences
developing in one way, while legal developments have gone in a different direction. In
addition, while many genocide scholars proclaim interest in prevention, very few pieces
related to genocide tie explicitly to this concern.
Genocide by attrition represents a new direction in genocide studies that demonstrates the ﬁeld’s elasticity and its ability to draw from historical episodes to understand,
in practical terms, present instances of genocide. Further, genocide by attrition is part
of the expanding literature that views both genocide and humanitarian crises as complex processes. While this article points to only one way in which the interpretation of
genocide by attrition can aid in genocide’s prevention, hopefully further research will
engage with the concept (positively or critically) and the many ways this interpretation
of the genocidal process may (or may not) aid in early warning.
Finally, many scholars in the ﬁeld talk about its interdisciplinary nature. However,
the ﬁeld is multidisciplinary, not interdisciplinary. An interdisciplinary approach is necessary to genuinely grasp the essential meaning of genocide. Because genocide envelops
the political, the social, and the legal, giving expression to its multifaceted dimensions
demands an interdisciplinary rather than multidisciplinary approach. While scholars
from politics, law, and social anthropology all engage in genocide studies, they rarely
engage with one another. Moreover, when they do, it is not uncommon for conversations to sink into deﬁnitional debates and academic pageantry. The ﬁeld would greatly
beneﬁt from more cross-pollination. For example, often there is a divide between legal
scholars and political (and other social) scientists. On the one hand, the former are usually interested in establishing clear legal deﬁnitions because the fundamental principles
of law—and criminal law in particular—require that crimes be deﬁned with precision as
a matter of fairness so that the individual is forewarned about the illegality of his or her
actions. The political scientists, on the other hand, view deﬁnitions and conceptual
debates as useful tools for establishing some parameter for the universe of admissible
cases and for elucidating links between structures and agency. These in turn are viewed
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as crucial to the development of generalizable models that can explain the causal links
between a set of variables and the observed phenomenon. By working together, a balance might be struck between ﬁdelity to deﬁnitional precision and a greater approximation of the ﬂuid and chaotic reality of the genocidal process. Similar conversations
should take place across varying disciplines. It is only then that the ﬁeld of genocide
studies will truly continue to move into a new and productive direction.
Sheri Rosenberg is Assistant Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights and Genocide
Clinic & Program in Holocaust and Human Rights Studies at Cardozo Law, New York. Previously, she was
awarded a Human Rights Fellowship at Columbia Law and completed her LL.M with honors. Her research
interests include non-discrimination in international law, minority rights, transitional justice, and genocide
prevention.

Notes
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

I wish to thank Professor Kathleen Cavanaugh for her insights on this article and Kelly Bonner, Gaelle
Uzan, and Kristy Lin for their excellent research and editing. I also would like to thank the editors of
Genocide Studies and Prevention, Henry Theriault and Samuel Totten, for inviting me to participate in
this endeavor and for their endless patience and editorial inputs. Of course, all errors are my own.
Scott Straus, “Contested Meanings and Conﬂicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide,”
Journal of Genocide Research 3,3 (2001): 359–68.
Christian Gerlach argues that genocide studies is not a discipline but an area dealing with certain phenomenon and therefore not bound to a sound methodological approach. See Christian Gerlach,
“Extremely Violent Societies: An Alternative to the Concept of Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research
8,4 (2006): 455–71, 463.
Dan Stone, “Introduction,” The Historiography of Genocide, ed. Dan Stone (Basingstoke: Plagrave Macmillan, 2008), 1–7, 1.
While some case studies and comparative case studies reveal genocidal patterns, the unfolding nature of
genocide is implied by the careful consideration of the socioeconomic, cultural, and historical factors
that lead to genocide. For example, in their descriptions of governmental structures, many authors
touch upon discriminatory practices that existed prior to the commencement of the genocide. This type
of study, however, is not the same as one that seeks to set forth speciﬁc typologies or generalizable characteristics.
Thomas Cushman, “Is Genocide Preventable? Some Theoretical Considerations,” Journal of Genocide
Research 5,4 (2003): 523–42.
Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, “Editors’ Introduction: Changing Themes in the Study of Genocide,” The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2010), 1–15, 8. Bloxham and Moses continue with the quote to emphasize that the tallest
mountains are connected contiguously to the smaller ones, illustrating their concern with the relationship between genocide and broader historical trends, periods, and structures.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm (accessed 7 Feb 2012).
William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000), 10.
Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Genocide (London: Pluto, 2004), 7.
Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1982); Eric
D. Weitz, A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2003); Gregory H. Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html (accessed 13 Jul 2011); Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in
Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2006).
Stanton, “8 Stages of Genocide.”
Helen Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust
(New York: Free Press, 1979), 210.
Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (New York: Columbia
UP, 2007).
Kuper, Genocide, 101.
Developing the concept of genocide by attrition is a project that Professor Everita Silina and I are
completing for publication in a forthcoming collection that will be edited by Joyce Apsel and Ernesto
Verdeja. In this article, I simply provide a sketch of the argument.
© 2012

Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1

doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.16

Genocide as Process
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

23

Helen Fein, “Genocide by Attrition 1939–1993: The Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan; Links
between Human Rights, Health, and Mass Atrocities,” Health and Human Rights 2,2 (1997): 10–45.
Helen Fein coined the term to describe the link between human rights, health, and mass death which
she observed in the cases of the Warsaw Ghetto, Cambodia, and Sudan. See Fein, “Genocide by Attrition.” In 1998 Mark Bradbury described the systematic persecutions of Nuba as genocide by attrition.
See Mark Bradbury, “Sudan: International Response to War in the Nuba Mountains,” Review of African
Political Economy 25,77 (1998): 463–74, 464. In his 2005 book, Donald Bloxham observed that by 1915
the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of the Armenians had crystallized into a policy of generals and “death
by attrition.” See Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide (New York: Oxford UP, 2005), 69.
Eric Reeves, “‘Two Darfurs’: Redeﬁning a Crisis for Political Purposes; Amidst Genocide by Attrition,
Expedient Misrepresentations Are Proliferating,” Sudan Tribune, 20 May 2005, http://www.sudantribune.
com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=9675 (accessed 13 Jul 2011).
Nicholas D. Kristof, “Genocide in Slow Motion,” The New York Review of Books, 9 Feb 2006; Michael
Petrou and Luiza Savage, “Genocide in Slow Motion,” Mclean’s 119,49 (2006): 35–41.
Gerard Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1982), 122.
“Whitewashing Darfur,” Europe Intelligence Wire, 14 Jun 2009; “Genocide Starts with Incitement to
Hate,” African News Service, 8 Apr 2009; “Commentary Calls for Joint Efforts to Fight Against War
Criminals in Sudan,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 7 Apr 2009; “Politics-Sudan: Aid Agencies
Accused, Expelled over Bashir Case,” Interpress Service, 9 Mar 2009; “Commentary Discusses Power
Struggle, Humanitarian Crisis in Zimbabwe,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 29 Jan 2009; “Why
ICC Prosecutor Went for President Bashir [opinion],” Africa News Service, 21 Jul 2008.
In a forthcoming paper (see note 15 above), Everita Silina and I use a historical, political, and legal lens
to give the term conceptual contours and place it within a sound theoretical framework that will lend it
analytical depth and practicality. In particular, the paper explores the concept of genocide by attrition
using the Ottoman Empire (May–Aug 1915), the Holocaust (1939–1943), Cambodia (1975–1979),
Southern Sudan (1983–1993), Ukraine (1932–1933), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995), and Darfur,
Sudan (2003–present) as primary case studies.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
Empirical evidence from cases of genocide can be found in Silina and Rosenberg’s forthcoming paper
(see note 15 above).
Lawrence Woocher, “Early Warning for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities” (paper presented at the 48th Annual ISA Convention, Chicago, IL, 2007).
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro: Case Concerning the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Judgment (26 Feb 2007), www.icj.org
(accessed 24 Feb 2012).

© 2012

Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1

doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.16

